Sometime around my 60th birthday it dawned on me that I’m not an economist (though I play one as a citizen in a democracy!). Yes, I’ve read books and articles by Nobel laureates and other prominent economists. I know the standard arguments on the right and left for, say, raising or lowering taxes. But is there any doubt that the liberal economist Paul Krugman or the conservative Eugene Fama, both Nobel Laureates, could demolish any of my arguments in the blink of an eye? How could I have been so foolish all these years? I know what expertise entails in the field in which I was a scholar for 30 some years; it should have been obvious to me that I’m not an expert in economics. Or foreign policy, although I subscribe to Foreign Affairs and read a lot. Or military science, although I worked as a civilian researcher in the Navy. Or, other areas of public policy. But it’s our job as citizens in a democracy to make up our mind on questions of government. And we all like to feel that we are good at our jobs. Recognizing that we are not experts, we should muddle through with humility: do our best, inform ourselves from the most reliable, expert sources of information and analysis, etc. But if we delude ourselves into having greater certainty than we have a right to, we will certainly make poor judgments.
That’s not just speculation. The prominent psychologist, Philip Tetlock, has been conducting research on what makes some political experts better at prediction than others. His earlier results are summarized in the book, “Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It?” Here experts were making predictions prior to major political events, such as the fall of the Soviet Union, the failure of the Communist regime in China to fall after the Tienamin Square uprising, the end of apartheid in South Africa, and the economic bubble of the “Asian Tiger” nations in the late 1990s. One of his strongest findings was that experts who were strongly wedded to an ideology or theory were worse predictors than those who were more open to various perspectives. Ideologies here included the familiar ones, such as liberal and conservative. Theories included realpolitik, shared by the Republican Henry Kissinger and the Democrat President Obama, as well as theories less familiar to laymen. Another finding worth noting was that confidence in ones judgments was negatively associated with accuracy. In sum, even among experts, partisanship impairs judgment, and humility is an asset. Imagine what partisanship must do to the rest of us!
Thus, the first reason to abandon partisanship is that partisanship leads to error. We, both layman and expert, don’t know enough to be certain about political questions and our ideologies are simply not adequate. The best we can do is to listen to people with expert knowledge holding diverse opinions.
For us non-experts, the typical fallback (cop-out?) strategy to compensate for our paucity of knowledge is to reduce political judgments to personal judgments. Normally, this involves claiming that the people who hold opinions different from ours are bad or stupid (or both). From a liberal perspective (with which I am more familiar) this involves believing that conservatives are either rich and bad or not rich and stupid, with some allowance for the possibility that some of the non-rich are bad and, perhaps, some of the rich are stupid. Certainly, conservatives have their own ad hominem arguments. Relying on ad hominem arguments, we don’t need to understand or evaluate the factual claims people make; we simply impugn their motives or character instead. Such arguments represent bankrupt thinking and have done so much to polarize our nation and dumb-down our politic discourse. Thus, partisanship drives us apart needlessly.
Third, reading the former Soviet refusenik, Natan Sharansky, made me realize that the ideological differences that so tear apart democratic societies such as ours pale in comparison to the differences between us collectively (which he refers to as “the world of freedom”) in contrast to dictatorships, extremists, terrorists, etc. (“the world of fear”). In his book, The Case of Democracy, Sharansky writes “..there is a far greater divide between the world of freedom and the world of fear than there is between the competing factions of a free society. If we fail to recognize this, we lose moral clarity….[The lack of moral clarity] is why people living in free societies can come to see their fellow citizens as their enemies, and foreign dictators as their friends.” This should sound familiar today, when some liberal Jews express greater hatred for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu than they do for the murderous leader of Syria, Assad or Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran who promises to exterminate Israel, or when President Obama shows greater animosity towards a democracy like Israel than towards a terrorist dictatorship such as Iran. In the aftermath of the tragedy of 911, after being attacked on our soil by the world of fear, I think Americans experienced a renewal of moral clarity, and thus a spirit of unity, but the feeling was sadly short lived (ending well before the divisive invasion of Iraq in 2003, by the way). I prefer the term moral perspective to moral clarity, because it is a failure to put things in proportion from a moral point of view. Thus, partisanship undermines our moral reasoning.
A fourth reason to reject partisanship is related to the last reason. Both the right and left have experienced major moments of losing moral perspective at crucial times in history. During the 1930s, it was unpopular among those on the right to support a strong stand against Hitler. One reason for this was that Hitler was seen as an opponent of Communism. For the opposite reason, those on the left tended to be more opposed to Hitler. Similarly, during the Cold War, it was unpopular in left-leaning circles, even moderate liberal ones, to be overly critical of the oppression of people living under Communist rule. (It must be mentioned that people tend to undergo a kind of amnesia about having held such views years later, and so may some of you.) Being sympathetic or even apologetic for oppressive, aggressive dictatorships because they are on the same side of the left-right spectrum as we represents a gross distortion of moral perspective. The distance between the typical American liberal and conservative is miniscule in comparison to the distance between either of them and a left or right wing dictatorship overseas.
A major source of such gross moral distortions is social conformism, to which all of us are prone. One must read about the actual thinking of common people at crucial moments of history to see this. For instance, during the 1930s the following argument seemed unimpeachable to conservatives, especially if delivered with aggressive self-confidence to like-minded people: “The ethnic Germans in the Czech-ruled Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia are being oppressed by the Czechs. So, of course, it is right for them to seek the shelter of the German state. Germany has good reason to take control of the Sudetenland, and Hitler has guaranteed in the treaty that he has no wish to control the remainder of Czechoslovakia, or any other European lands. Cassandras like Churchill want war and should be dismissed.” The power of social conformism is what makes arguments such as these seem so powerful at certain moments in history in certain social environments. Yet people who espoused such arguments held core beliefs that were widely different from Nazism, and they soon came to see their error (except for those who forgot they ever made an error, as many did and do).
Thus, partisanship encourages social conformity. Social conformity is a very power force influencing human thinking, as demonstrated by massive psychological research. We belong to many groups, such as country, religion, ethnic group, etc., in addition to party and ideology. Some of these groups we can’t easily leave and some we reasonably don’t want to abandon. But groups that are not essential to our way of life or our identity we may well consider abandoning, since identification with any group will tend to distort our thinking, both rationally and morally. In my case, I decided that I can live quite happily without identifying with an ideology or political party, and given the costs of such identifications, I would rather do without them. Social conformism overlaps with the other three problems with partisanship (rational distortion, divisiveness, and moral distortion) and exacerbates them.
In sum, my four arguments in favor of nonpartisanship are that partisanship promotes intellectual distortion, needless divisiveness among people who really have much in common, loss of moral perspective, and social conformism.